The effect of organisational ethical climate and peer monitoring control systems on budgetary slack: an experimental study / Vincent K Chong and Danny Sudarso by K Chong, Vincent & Sudarso, Danny
THE EFFECT OF ORGANIZATIONAL 
ETHICAL CLIMATE AND PEER 
MONITORING CONTROL SYSTEMS  
ON BUDGETARY SLACK: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
Vincent K Chong
Danny Sudarso
Business School,
University of Western Australia, Australia
ABSTRACT
This study aims to address the following research questions: (1) Does a 
peer monitoring control system provide an ideal opportunity for managers 
to build slack into their budgets in team-based settings? (2) Does the 
organizational ethical climate influence managers’ propensity to create 
budgetary slack? (3) What is the effect of peer monitoring control systems 
and the organizational ethical climate on managers’ budgetary slack 
creation? A laboratory experiment was conducted. The results indicate 
that a peer monitoring control system provides an ideal opportunity for 
managers to build slack into their budgets. The results of this study suggest 
that the organizational ethical climate can influence subordinates’ ethical 
behaviors. It was found that under a weak organizational ethical climate, 
subordinates were more likely to engage in opportunistic behavior. Finally, 
the results demonstrated that budgetary slack creation was lowest in the 
absence of a peer monitoring control system and where there was a strong 
organizational ethical climate.
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INTRODUCTION
One issue that is arguably the most problematic in the budgeting process 
is the creation of budgetary slack. From an organizational perspective, 
the adverse implication of budgetary slack is that slack budgets do not 
represent managers’ best estimates of expected results, and they hinder the 
planning and control, resource allocation, and coordination of business 
unit activities (Baiman, 1982; Choudhury, 1985; Covaleski, Evans, Luft 
& Shields, 2003). A number of prior studies have addressed this issue, 
specifically by focusing on the determinants of budget slack (Onsi, 1973; 
Young, 1985; Waller, 1988; Chow, Cooper & Waller, 1988, 1991; Cyert & 
March, 1992; Fisher, Frederickson & Peffer, 2000, 2002a; Fisher, Maines, 
Peffer & Sprinkle, 2002b; Kren & Maiga, 2007). Prior agency theory based 
studies have identified the determinants of subordinates’ propensity to create 
budgetary slack, including information asymmetry (e.g., Young 1985; Fisher, 
Frederickson & Peffer, 2002a; Fisher, Maines, Peffer & Sprinkle 2002b; 
Kren & Maiga, 2007), risk aversion (e.g., Onsi, 1973; Cyert & March, 1992), 
and incentive-based pay schemes (e.g., Chow, Cooper & Waller, 1988, 
1991; Waller, 1988; Fisher, Frederickson & Peffer, 2000). Agency theory 
assumes that individuals are economically rational and motivated solely by 
opportunistic self-interest. As a result, when circumstances are conducive 
to the creation of slack (e.g., the existence of information asymmetry and 
slack-inducing schemes), a risk-averse agent will wish to maximize his/
her slack creation.
Other studies have identified the means by which budgetary slack may 
be controlled as including subordinates’ reputation and ethical concerns 
(e.g., Stevens, 2002), variance investigation policy (e.g., Webb, 2002), 
subordinates’ honesty and superiors’ authority (e.g., Rankin, Schwartz & 
Young, 2008), trust in superiors, truthfulness in revealing private information 
(e.g., Chong & Ferdiansah, 2011), and accountability pressures (e.g., 
Chong, Leong & Woodliff, 2011). Collectively, these studies have focused 
primarily on individual-based decision-making settings. A frequent criticism 
of individual-based decision-making settings is that such findings may not 
be applicable in today’s business environment because decision-making 
processes such as budget-setting occur increasingly in a team-based setting 
(Cohen & Bailey, 1997; Wellins, Byham & Dixon, 1994). This paper aims to 
examine budgetary slack creation by subordinates in a team-based setting.
43
The Effect of Organizational Ethical Climate and Peer Monitoring Control Systems
A number of studies have examined reliance on peer monitoring 
(e.g., Towry, 2003; Loughry & Tosi, 2008; Zhang, 2008) as an effective 
management control. Towry (2003) defined peer monitoring as a system 
whereby the ability of team members to observe each other’s actions is 
exploited by the principal to extract private information. Zhang (2008) 
suggested that collusive behavior may exist under a peer monitoring control 
system. The degree of collusive climate created by factors such as increased 
inter-agent communication and agents’ perception of an unfair principal 
is expected to intensify the effect of a peer monitoring control system in 
the creation of budgetary slack when there are vertical private information 
conditions. In addition, it is anticipated that agents are also expected to 
collude in the creation of budgetary slack as a result of incentives packages in 
the form of slack-inducing schemes.1 This study aims to investigate whether 
the presence of a peer monitoring control system generates an opportunity 
for subordinates to create budgetary slack.
Experimental studies of budgetary slack creation have found that 
certain subjects violate standard agency theory predictions. For example, 
numerous studies found that factors such as social influence pressures 
(Young, 1985) and ethical concerns (Stevens, 2002) reduced budgetary 
slack. Indeed, the accounting literature on project escalation decisions 
suggests that factors such as ethical reasoning (Rutledge & Karim, 1999) and 
the ethical environment (Booth & Schulz, 2004) can mitigate self-interested 
behaviour. For example, Booth and Schulz (2004) note that “…a strong 
ethical environment may lead to a general tendency for managers to act in 
the interests of their organizations and, more specifically, a reduced tendency 
for managers to act opportunistically under agency problem conditions.” 
This paper aims to test whether the presence of a strong organizational 
ethical climate can be used as a management control to mitigate budgetary 
slack creation; and also the joint effect of a peer monitoring control system 
and a strong organizational ethical climate on budgetary slack creation.
1 A slack-inducing scheme basically rewards agents with a fixed salary if the actual amount equals 
or is below the budget target. However, if the budget target is exceeded (“excess unit”), agents are 
rewarded with a fixed salary plus a piece-rate component, which is calculated as the excess unit 
multiplied by an agreed rate.
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Based on the above, we pose the following research questions:
1. Does a peer monitoring control system provide an ideal opportunity 
for managers to build slack into their budgets in a team-based setting?
2. Does organizational ethical climate influence managers’ propensity 
to create budgetary slack?
3. What are the effects of peer monitoring control systems and 
organizational ethical climate on managers’ budgetary slack creation?
The remainder of this paper is divided into the following sections. The 
first section develops hypotheses. The second section provides an overview 
of the research design and the dependent and independent variables, and the 
third section presents the results. The final section discusses the conclusions 
derived from the study and limitations of the study.
THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES
The Relationship between Information Availability and 
Budgetary Slack
Based on agency theory, if the agent has private information which 
the principal cannot gain access to without cost, then the agent may be 
work-averse and risk-averse (Baiman, 1990). As a result, subordinates 
are likely to engage in adverse selection (misrepresentation of skills and 
abilities) and moral hazards (shirking behavior) when exposed to situations 
of conflict of interest with their superiors who are not able to observe the 
level of effort exerted by their subordinates (Loughry & Tosi, 2008). This is 
possible due to the presence of information asymmetry (private information) 
between agents and their superiors. According to Fisher, Frederickson & 
Peffer, (2002a), when there is information asymmetry, superiors are not 
aware of the subordinates’ performance capabilities, and hence there is a 
greater likelihood that subordinates’ initial budget proposals will at least 
partially influence their superiors. They also added that subordinates made 
significantly lower budget proposals under conditions of information 
asymmetry than under conditions of information symmetry. In contrast, 
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when the agents’ performance capabilities are only available to themselves 
(i.e., information asymmetry), agents are likely to engage in behavior that 
allows them to maximize their own interests and disregard the interests 
of the firm, as the principal does not have sufficient information to detect 
any dysfunctional behaviour. Therefore, it is expected that budgetary slack 
will be higher when information is kept private than when information is 
publicly available.
The Relationship between Peer Monitoring Control Systems 
and Budgetary Slack
The first hypothesis focuses on reliance on peer monitoring control 
systems to address vertical agency problems (i.e., the presence of vertical 
information asymmetry) in a team-based setting. Peer monitoring refers 
to a control system where team members have the ability to observe each 
other’s actions (Towry, 2003). Due to similarities in work conditions, it is 
expected that agents can often acquire information about other agents that 
is not directly available to the principal (Fama & Jesnen, 1983). As a result, 
agents are also more likely than the principal is to be aware of co-workers’ 
opportunistic behavior. We reply on the issues relating to individual and 
collective-based decision-making processes to develop our arguments for 
H1. It is suggested that collective decision-makers created more budgetary 
slack than individuals under slack-inducing contracts (Hunton & Kohlmeyer, 
2004). This finding is based on two key factors; namely, collective units’ 
competitiveness and accountability pressures. First, prior research has 
suggested that collective units are more competitive than individuals, 
even in the absence of collective extrinsic rewards (Dardis et al., 1990; 
Drigotas, Graetz, Insko, Schopler & Smith, 1991; Insko & Schopler, 1992; 
Dahl, Drigotas, Graetz, Insko, Schopler & Smith, 1993). Intra-group social 
processes, particularly collective discussions, which foster an atmosphere 
of defeating the perceived competition generate these competitive feelings 
(Morgan & Tindale, 2002). 
Consequently, collective discussion of budgetary incentive contracts 
would stimulate the collectively-oriented competitive spirit, thereby 
resulting in collective units attempting to “game” the budgetary process more 
aggressively than individuals do in an effort to win. Second, accountability 
theory suggests that individuals, as compared to collective units, may be 
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more reluctant to succumb to extreme positions or make risky decisions 
because individuals inherently feel more accountable for their decisions, 
even in the absence of external accountability mechanisms (Tetlock, 
1985; Fandt & Ferris, 1990; Kroon, Rabbie & Van Kreveld, 1992; Frink 
& Klimonski, 1998). Individual decision-makers’ heightened feelings 
of accountability arise, in part, because there is no collective unit within 
which the individual can hide or shirk their responsibility (Liden, Wayne, 
Judge, Sparrowe, Kraimer & Franz, 1999). Consequently, the extent of 
slack that individuals build into their budgets should be less extreme than 
in collective units due to heightened feelings of personal accountability. 
Taken together, the literature outlined above suggests that in the presence 
of a peer monitoring control system, subordinates are more likely to have 
opportunities to engage in dysfunctional behavior (i.e., to build slack into 
their budget). Thus, the following hypothesis, in its alternative form, is 
tested:
H1: Budgetary slack will be higher in the presence, rather than 
absence, of a peer monitoring control situation.
The Relationship between Organizational Ethical Climate and 
Budgetary Slack
Organizational ethical climate refers to “…a type of organizational 
work climate, which is best understood as a group of prescriptive climates 
reflecting organizational procedures, policies, and practices with moral 
consequences (Cullen, Parboteeah & Victor, 2003, Martin & Cullent, 2006). 
Prior studies (Appelbaum, Deguire & Lay, 2005; Peterson, 2002; Wimbush 
& Shepard, 1994) suggest that the ethical climate of an organization can be 
used to predict not only counterproductive behaviors, but unethical behavior 
such as budgetary slack creation (Douglas & Wier, 2000). This study focuses 
on budgetary slack as an unethical behavior.
We propose that agents’ perceptions of factors within an organization’s 
climate will influence their control consciousness. These organizational 
climate factors include the principal’s integrity and fairness, ethical 
standards and values, and philosophy and style. It follows that agents’ 
behaviors can be influenced and motivated by the senior management 
(the principal) of their organizations, as they set the tone for the internal 
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workplace climate of the organization. Indeed, prior studies (e.g., Francis, 
Huang & Zang 2008; Roger & Stocken, 2005; Cianci & Kaplan, 2010; 
Chong & Ferdiansah, 2011; Chong & Loy, 2015) have suggested that a 
leader’s reputation can influence the behavioral intentions of subordinates. 
Similarly, earlier studies (Arnold, Lampe & Sutton, 1999, 2000; Booth & 
Schulz, 2004) have argued that organizations can foster a workplace climate 
where weak or strong ethical decision-making can occur.
In a weak organizational ethical climate, there is a lack of social 
ties between the subordinates and the principal, which will result in 
the subordinates feeling that their work is not appreciated. This will 
subsequently generate a series of dysfunctional behaviors to suppress 
their negative feelings, and through inter-agent communication, collusive 
behavior is expected to increase as other team members begin to either 
consciously or unconsciously justify the dysfunctional behavior as the 
result of their perception of their principal’s lack of fairness. In this regard, 
if agents are allowed to behave in a manner that is driven by the extent of 
their perceptions of, and reactions to, the organizational climate, they are 
expected to decrease their reporting honesty. When there is an increase in 
inter-agent communication, this is expected to have a spreading effect such 
that other team members will rationalize the dysfunctional behavior and 
become followers instead of whistle-blowers (Zhang, 2008). As a result, 
we posit that budgetary slack creation is likely to be high, especially under 
private information conditions. On the other hand, it is suggested “…an 
organization with a strong ethical climate will create a general tendency 
for managers to more strongly align their behavior with the norms of the 
organization, resulting in greater levels of ethical decision-making by 
managers within the organization” (Booth & Schulz, 2004). Thus, under 
a strong organizational ethical climate, the propensity to create budgetary 
slack is likely to be low in a low information asymmetry situation. Taken 
together, the second hypothesis, in its alternative form, is tested:
H2: Budgetary slack will be lower in a strong, rather than a weak, 
organizational ethical climate.
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The Effect of Peer Monitoring and Organizational Ethical 
Climate on Budgetary Slack
As noted earlier, the presence of a peer monitoring system provides 
the opportunity for the subordinates to build slack into their budgets in a 
high information asymmetry situation. On the other hand, the absence of 
peer monitoring system does not provide the opportunity for budgetary 
slack to be created (i.e., H1). With regard to organizational ethical climate, 
in a weak ethical climate, it is expected that the employees’ propensity to 
create slack is high, while in a strong ethical climate, the subordinates’ 
propensity to create budgetary slack is likely to be low (i.e., H2). Thus, it 
is concluded that peer monitoring and organizational ethical climate work 
independently to affect subordinates’ budgetary slack creation, but it is not 
known precisely when these two variables combine to jointly affect slack 
creation by subordinates in the budget-setting process.
The literature suggests that the effect of a peer monitoring control 
system may result in increased inter-agent communication, agent’s 
perceptions of an unfair principal (Zhang, 2008), and the extent the 
organization’s ethical climate can be used to predict unethical behavior 
such as subordinates’ propensity to create slack (Appelbaum, Deguire & 
Lay, 2005; Peterson, 2002; Wimbush & Shepard, 1994). We predict that the 
combination of the absence of a peer monitoring control system and a weak 
organizational ethical climate is expected to provide conditions conducive 
to the creation of slack. However, the combination of the presence of a 
peer monitoring control system and a weak organizational ethical climate 
is expected to intensify subordinates’ propensity to create budgetary slack 
significantly. Conversely, we predict that a strong organizational ethical 
climate is expected to provide conditions that decrease or mitigate the 
incentive to create budgetary slack in the absence of a peer monitoring 
control system. Therefore, the third hypothesis, in its alternative form, is 
tested:
H3: Budgetary slack will be lower in a strong, rather than a weak, 
organizational ethical climate in the absence of a peer monitoring 
control system.
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METHOD
Subjects
The subjects for this experiment were 74 undergraduate commerce 
students who were enrolled in the Bachelor of Commerce program of a large 
Australian university. These students had taken at least two management 
accounting courses, where they studied budget preparation and various 
issues related to the budget-setting process. It was necessary for the subjects 
to have basic budget-related knowledge for the purpose of this experiment 
to improve its quality and success rate. Of the 74 subjects, eight failed the 
manipulation check and thus were excluded from the data analysis. Ashton 
and Krames (1980) argued that it is justifiable to utilize undergraduate 
students as a proxy for managers, particularly for tasks involving decision-
making and information processing. Furthermore, Hunton (2001) stated 
that students and business professionals are comparatively similar in the 
ways that they acquire and interpret socially acquired cognitions, such as 
procedural knowledge. Therefore, the use of students in this study was 
deemed to be appropriate. Subjects were compensated with AUS$15.00 
for their participation in the experiment.
Experimental Procedures
Stage One: Training and Trial Sessions
The objective of this stage was to familiarize the subjects with the 
tasks and establish their performance capabilities. The subjects were given 
the first set of booklets, which contained the task overview, a decoding key, 
a training session worksheet with examples, and a trial session worksheet. 
They were asked to assume the role of a production manager at a fictitious 
company, the Beta Company, and told that one of their major responsibilities 
was to prepare the budget. They were then instructed to perform a five-
minute decoding task in each session.
The decoding task involved a simple exercise adapted from Chow 
(1983). The task requires the subjects to decode a series of letters and 
transform the letters into the corresponding numbers based on a decoding 
key. The subjects were then required to “solve” the codes by adding up the 
numbers generated during the exercise without using a calculator, within five 
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minutes. Each subject was provided with a packet of codes that contained 
a mixture of two types of codes, where the subject could choose any code 
they preferred to solve in random order. The type “A” code contained a set 
of four letters that correspond to a two-digit number. This type of code is 
solved by adding up the four two-digit numbers. The type “Z” code is more 
complex as it involves a set of five letters that correspond to a four-digit 
number. This type of code is also solved by adding up the five four-digit 
numbers. For each correctly solved code, subjects would receive reward 
points. The reward points were used as the basis for the subjects to set their 
budget targets. Subjects who solved the type “Z” code received 50 reward 
points whereas those who solve the type “A” code received 25 reward points. 
At the end of the five-minute training and trial sessions, the subjects were 
asked to add up the total reward points they managed to obtain. Finally, the 
subjects were asked to indicate their best estimate of the number of reward 
points they expected to achieve if they were to repeat the same tasks with 
the same time constraint during the work session (i.e., in Stage Two).
Stage Two: Employee’s Pay Scheme, Treatment Conditions 
and Work Session
Subjects were randomly assigned to form a two-person team and 
were randomly allocated to one of the four treatment conditions: (1) a weak 
organizational ethical climate and no peer monitoring control system, (2) a 
weak organizational ethical climate and a peer monitoring control system, 
(3) a strong organizational ethical climate and no peer monitoring control 
system and (4) a strong organizational ethical climate and a peer monitoring 
control system. They were then provided with the second set of booklets, 
which contained the employee’s pay scheme, case study, manipulation 
check questionnaires, post-experimental questionnaires, a decoding key 
and work session worksheet.
The employee’s pay scheme is as follows:
 P = F  if A ≤ B
  = F + X (A - B)  if A > B
where:
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P = Total compensation (Total pay);
F = Fixed compensation (Base pay) – Set at $5;
X = Subordinate compensation per actual reward point over budget 
(Piece rate) – Set at $2;
A = Actual reward point;
B = Budget reward point;
The employee’s pay scheme is a slack-inducing scheme, as utilized 
in prior studies (e.g., Fisher, Frederickson & Peffer, 2000, 2002b; Stevens, 
2002). The compensation scheme includes a fixed salary component (F) and 
a piece rate (bonus) component (X) for actual reward points (A) achieved 
in excess of the budget reward points (B). This slack-inducing scheme 
encourages employees to maximize their pay (for this study, the reward 
points earned). To maximize their pay, employees must perform above 
the budgeted target, which means that the employees will attempt to set a 
budget target that is lower in order to achieve their goal by building slack 
into the budget.2
First, the subjects were asked to examine the employee pay scheme and 
read the case study. Second, they were asked to complete the manipulation 
check questionnaires to test their understanding of the experiment. Third, 
they were instructed to state their individual budget target; in other words, 
the number of reward points that they had budgeted to achieve based on the 
conditions that applied to them. Fourth, those that were in the groups where 
peer monitoring was present were instructed to share their performance 
capabilities and individual budget targets with their team members. This 
activity was omitted for those that were in the groups where peer monitoring 
did not occur. Fifth, they were asked to state their group budget target (i.e., 
the consensus budget target). Finally, they were instructed to perform a 
five-minute decoding task in the work session. The primary objective of 
the work session was to establish the subjects’ actual performance. At the 
end of the session, they were asked to complete the post-experimental 
questionnaire and supply their demographic information. This study focuses 
on the presence of vertical information asymmetry (i.e., between agents 
and the principal). To elicit the presence of vertical private information, 
2 Similar to Chow (1983), the compensation scheme is “make-believe” in that no actual payment 
was involved. However, the subjects were told that their aim was to maximize their compensation 
and each subject was rewarded with AUD$15 for participating in the experiment.
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the subjects were told that their performance capabilities were kept private 
and were unlikely to be discovered by their superior .
To represent a strong organizational ethical climate, the relevant 
subjects read the following case study: The Beta Company has a 
decentralized organizational structure. Senior management continues to 
delegate complete autonomy to subordinate managers for decisions. They 
believe that decentralizing decision-making has the benefit of leading to 
faster decision-making, increasing motivation among sub-unit managers, 
promoting organizational learning, and encouraging managers’ focus on 
strategic planning for their sub-unit. The Beta Company operates in an 
organization where high ethical standards are valued and appreciated. 
Employees of the Beta Company are currently working in an environment 
where trustworthiness, justice, fairness, respect, and honesty are of 
paramount importance. Furthermore, it is noted that communication and 
cooperation among team members is excellent. The Beta Company does 
not tolerate employees who engage in dysfunctional behaviors, and in the 
past the company has taken disciplinary action against employees who 
have violated the company’s code of conduct or engaged in dysfunctional 
behavior. The disciplinary actions taken against such employees include 
removing their entitlement for an annual salary increment and/or bonus, 
prohibiting their participation in the budget-setting process, reducing their 
prospects for promotion or career advancement, and the possibility of 
terminating their employment contract.
To represent a weak organizational ethical climate, the relevant 
subjects read the following case study: The Beta Company has a 
decentralized organizational structure. Senior management continues to 
delegate complete autonomy to subordinate managers for decisions. They 
believe that decentralizing decision-making has the benefit of leading to 
faster decision-making, increasing motivation among sub-unit managers, 
promoting organizational learning, and encouraging managers’ focus 
on strategic planning for their sub-unit. Despite the above benefits, the 
employees of Beta Company are currently working in an environment where 
trustworthiness, justice, fairness, respect, and honesty are low. In addition, 
it is noted that communication and cooperation among team members is 
also very poor. A frustrated employee complained that:
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…Beta Company is operating in an environment where high 
ethical standards are not valued and appreciated. Employees 
of this organization tell senior management what they want to 
hear rather than the truth!
Another ex-Beta Company employee commented:
…In my view, Beta Company’s senior management is unfair. 
When it comes to promotion decisions, established policies and 
rules are irrelevant! … In addition, employees can get away 
with engaging in dysfunctional activities without any forms of 
punishment.
A highly dissatisfied employee who had resigned and left the company 
claimed:
…I can’t remember any disciplinary actions that have been taken 
against employees who have violated the company’s Code of 
Conduct or engaged in dysfunctional behaviors. These employees 
just received a verbal warning instead.
Manipulation Check Questionnaire
A manipulation check questionnaire was included to assess to the 
subjects’ perceptions of the treatment conditions that applied to them. The 
subjects were asked to confirm their understanding of the circumstances 
that they had been placed under (low or high organizational ethical climate).
RESULTS
H1 predicts that budgetary slack will be higher in the presence of a peer 
monitoring control system, rather than when such a system is absent. As 
illustrated in Table 1, Panel A, the main effect of a peer monitoring control 
system was statistically significant (F-value = 22.274, p < 0.001), which 
provides initial support for H1. Further analysis, as shown in Table 1, Panel 
B, demonstrated that the mean budgetary slack created in the presence of 
a peer monitoring control system (227.188) was higher than that created 
when a peer monitoring control system was absent (18.824). An independent 
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t-test was performed to assess whether the difference between these two 
means was statistically significant. The result indicates that this difference 
is significant (t-value = -4.263, p < 0.001). This provides additional support 
for H1.
Table 1: Two-way ANOVA and the Mean Scores for Budgetary Slack Across 
Organizational Ethical Climate and Peer Monitoring Control Systems 
Conditions, and Multiple Comparisons of Mean Scores
Panel A: Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) Results
Source df Mean Square F-value p-value
Organizational Ethical Climate (EOC)
Peer Monitoring Control Systems 
(PMCS)
EOC x PMCS
Error
1
1
1
29
225250.248
490705.248
4709.534
22030.687
10.224
22.274
0.214
0.003
0.001
0.647
Panel B: Mean and Standard Deviation for Budgetary Slack Creation
Peer Monitoring 
Control Systems
Organizational Ethical Climate
Total
Weak Strong
Absent Cell 1
Mean 93.750
S.D. (103.294)
n = 8
Cell 2
Mean -47.778
S.D. (235.944)
n = 9
Mean 18.824
S.D. (194.435)
n = 17
Present Cell 3
Mean 361.875
S.D. (107.003)
n = 8
Cell 4
Mean 172.500
S.D. (74.354)
n = 8
Mean 267.188
S.D. (132.237)
n = 16
Total Mean 227.813
S.D. (186.570)
n = 16
Mean 55.882
S.D. (207.600)
n = 17
Mean 139.242
S.D. (207.335)
n = 33
Panel C: Planned Contrast
Value of contrast t-statistics p-Value
H3: Cell 2 < Cells 1, 3 and 4 -771.458 -4.432 0.001
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H2 predicts that budgetary slack will be lower in a strong, rather than 
a weak, organizational ethical climate. As illustrated in Table 1, Panel A, 
the main effect of organizational ethical climate was statistically significant 
(F-value = 10.224, p < 0.003), which provides initial support for H2. 
Further analysis, as shown in Table 1, Panel B, demonstrated that the mean 
of budgetary slack created under a strong organizational ethical climate 
(55.882) was lower than that under a weak organizational ethical climate 
(227.813). An independent t-test was performed to assess whether the 
difference in the two means was statistically different. The result indicated 
that this difference is statistically different (t-value = 2.583, p < 0.015). This 
provides additional support for H2.
H3 predicts that budgetary slack will be lower in a strong, rather than 
a weak, organizational ethical climate in the absence of a peer monitoring 
control system. To test H3, a planned contrast was constructed to compare 
the mean of Cell 2 and the other cells (i.e., Cell 1, Cell 3 and Cell 4) as shown 
in Table 1, Panel B. As shown in Table 1, Panel C, the result suggested that 
the planned contrast was statistically significant (t = -4,432, p < 0.001).3 
Thus, H3 is supported.
3 The planned contrast weights were assigned based on a method suggested by Buckless and 
Ravenscroft (1990). The contrast weights were coded as follows: Cell 1 = -1, Cell 2 = 3, Cell 3 = 
-1 and Cell 4 = -1
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Figure 1: The Interaction Effect between Organizational Ethical Climate 
and Peer Monitoring Control Systems on Mean Budgetary Slack
Figure 1 presents the nature of the two-way interaction between 
organizational thic l climat  and peer monitoring control systems. It can be 
observed from the diagram that the budgetary slack created in the presence 
of a peer monitoring control system is higher than that in the absence of 
this system, notwithstanding the degree of organizational ethical climate. 
Budgetary slack is observed to have the lowest mean value (Cell 2 = -47.778, 
see Table 1, Panel B) in the absence of a peer monitoring control system 
under a strong organizational ethical climate.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This study aims to address the following the following research questions: 
(1) Does a peer monitoring control system provide an ideal opportunity for 
managers to build slack into their budgets in team-based settings? (2) Does 
the organizational ethical climate influence managers’ propensity to create 
budgetary slack? (3) What is the joint effect of a peer monitoring control 
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system and the organizational ethical climate on managers’ budgetary slack 
creation?
The findings of this study carry a number of theoretical implications; 
first, our results indicate that a peer monitoring control system provides an 
ideal opportunity for managers to build slack into their budgets. This result 
is consistent with our theoretical expectations. We propose two reasons 
for why peer monitoring control systems provide an ideal opportunity for 
managers to create budgetary slack. First, we argue that collective units are 
more competitive than individuals. We propose that collective discussion 
of budgetary incentive contracts would stimulate the collectively-oriented 
competitive spirit, thereby resulting in collective units attempting to 
“game” the budgetary process more aggressively than individuals might 
in an effort to win. Second, relying on accountability theory, we suggest 
that individuals may be more tempted to succumb to extreme positions or 
make risky decisions because they inherently feel more accountable for their 
decisions. Individuals’ heightened feelings of accountability arise, in part, 
because there is no collective unit within which they can hide or shirk their 
responsibility (Liden, Wayne, Judge, Sparrowe, Kraimer & Franz, 1999). 
Consequently, the extent of slack that individuals build into their 
budgets should be less extreme than that found in collective units due to 
their heightened feeling of personal accountability. Second, the findings 
of this study suggest that the organizational ethical climate can influence 
subordinates’ ethical behaviors. It was found that in a weak organizational 
ethical climate, subordinates were more likely to engage in opportunistic 
behavior. The rationale for this behavior is that subordinate perceived 
that there was a lack of social ties with their principal, which may create 
the perception that their work is not appreciated. Such perceptions will 
subsequently generate a series of dysfunctional behaviors to suppress 
their negative feelings, as well as inter-agent communication and collusive 
behavior. As a result, these individuals are expected to reduce their reporting 
honesty. Thus, budgetary slack creation is likely to be high. Third, our 
findings demonstrate that the mean value of budgetary slack creation is the 
lowest in the absence of a peer monitoring control system and in a strong 
organizational ethical climate when compared to the other cases (see Table 
1, Panel B). This result suggests that the ethical climate of an organization 
can be used as an informal control to mitigate subordinates’ propensity 
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to create budgetary slack. From a practical perspective, this study has 
generated findings that alert leaders of organizations to exercise caution 
before implementing a peer monitoring control system, particularly in the 
context of budget setting.
This paper is subject to several caveats. First, although the use of 
this experimental design to study the effects of a peer monitoring control 
system and organizational ethical climate in the creation of budgetary 
slack offers the likelihood of high internal validity as it enables decision-
making behavior to be studied in a controlled climate, the case materials 
employed to reflect a simplified budget-setting participation situation may 
not capture all the variables in a real business setting. As a result, care 
should be taken when generalizing the findings of this study. Second, only 
a relatively small number of subjects were sourced for the experiment. This 
represents a reactive arrangement factor which may threaten the external 
validity of the findings. An increase in the number of subjects will provide 
a better representation of the population, which is desirable to enhance 
generalizability. Third, maturation factors, such as if subjects were tired or 
bored, may affect the consistency and internal validity. Finally, a testing 
factor might represent a threat to internal validity if the training and trial 
session had an influence on the work session.
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